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Abstract 
We study a model in which retired single people optimally choose consumption, medical 
spending and saving while facing uncertainty about their health, lifespan and medical needs. This 
uncertainty is partially offset by insurance provided by the government and private institutions. 
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   1 Introduction
Many poorer Americans receive health insurance through Medicaid, a
public program run jointly by the federal and state governments. In 2008,
total Medicaid outlays in the U.S. totalled 339 billion dollars, 2% of GDP.
An important group of Medicaid beneﬁciaries is the elderly and the disabled,
including those with long-term care needs. The other main public health
insurance program for the elderly and disabled, Medicare, reimburses only
a limited amount of long-term care costs, and most elderly people do not
have private long-term care insurance. As a result, Medicaid covers almost
all nursing home costs of poor old recipients. In 2008, 24% of Medicaid
expenditures went to the elderly and 42% went to the disabled (some of whom
are also elderly). Medicaid now assists 70% of nursing home residents.1
Because the need to pay for health care at very old ages is potentially a
signiﬁcant savings motive, the insurance provided by Medicaid may have sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on saving. Hubbard et al. [13] and Scholz et al. [18] argue that
means-tested social insurance programs (in the form of a minimum consump-
tion ﬂoor) provide strong incentives for low-income individuals not to save.
Brown and Finkelstein [2] conclude that Medicaid could explain the lack of
private long-term care insurance for about two-thirds of the wealth distri-
bution. De Nardi, French and Jones [6] ﬁnd that reducing the generosity of
social insurance signiﬁcantly increases the saving of elderly singles. Kopecky
and Koreshkova [15] ﬁnd that old-age medical expenses, and the coverage of
these expenses provided by Medicaid, have large eﬀects on aggregate capital
accumulation.
In this paper, we study a model in which retired single people optimally
choose consumption, medical spending and saving while facing uncertainty
about their health, lifespan and medical needs. This uncertainty is partially
oﬀset by insurance provided by the government and private institutions. We
ﬁrst show how well the model matches important features of the data and
we analyze the degree of insurance provided by current programs. We then
study some policy reforms, meant to capture recent changes in Medicaid and
Medicare, analyzing the eﬀects of these reforms on out-of-pocket and total
medical expenditures, and savings.
We extend the existing literature by focusing on Medicaid, and by ana-
lyzing its insurance role for people with diﬀerent wealth and income levels,
1Statistics assembled by the Kaiser Foundation [16].
2health, and gender. We estimate the parameters of our model rather than
calibrating them to previous studies, which might have features which are
inconsistent with the model at hand. We require our model to ﬁt well across
the entire income distribution, rather than simply explain mean or median
behavior. We model medical expenditure as an endogenous choice. This al-
lows us to consider how Medicaid and Medicare reforms aﬀect total medical
spending. We model social insurance as providing a utility ﬂoor, rather than
a ﬁxed expenditure ﬂoor. This allows means-tested transfers to vary with
medical needs in a way consistent with actual practice.2 Due to the richness
and complexity of our framework, we focus on the post-retirement part of
the life-cycle and adopt a partial equilibrium approach.
We ﬁnd that the model matches the life-cycle proﬁles of assets and out-of-
pocket medical spending for elderly singles in diﬀerent cohorts and permanent
income groups. It also generates an elasticity of total medical expenditures
to co-pay changes that is close to the one estimated in the data.
We ﬁnd that the current Medicaid system provides diﬀerent kinds of in-
surance to households with diﬀerent permanent income levels. Households in
the lower permanent income quintiles are much more likely to receive Med-
icaid transfers, but the transfers that they receive are on average relatively
small. Households in the higher permanent income quintiles are much less
likely to receive any Medicaid pay-outs, but when they do, these pay-outs are
very big and correspond to severe and expensive medical conditions. There-
fore, Medicaid is an eﬀective insurance device for the poorest, but also oﬀers
very valuable insurance to the rich by insuring them against catastrophic
medical conditions. For this reason, we ﬁnd that making Medicaid more
generous reduces the elderly’s savings at all permanent income levels, includ-
ing the highest. Making Medicaid more generous also increases total medical
expenditures, especially for lower-income households, but it decreases the
out-of-pocket costs actually paid by households.
We also study the eﬀects of changing the generosity of Medicare by re-
ducing the co-pays that elderly people incur when consuming medical goods
and services. As in the previous experiment, households become more fully
2Two recent papers contain life-cycle models where the choice of medical expenditures
also aﬀects health outcomes. In addition to having diﬀerent emphases, both papers model
Medicaid in ways diﬀerent from our’s. Feng [7] models Medicaid as an insurance policy
with no premiums and extremely low—possibly zero—co-paymentrates. Fonseca et al. [10]
assume that the consumption ﬂoor is invariant to medical needs (private conversation with
Pierre-Carl Michaud).
3insured by the government as a result of this reform and thus decrease their
savings. This reform, however, beneﬁts higher permanent income people
more than poorer ones, because the poor were already well insured by Med-
icaid. Total medical expenditures rise at all ages, not only when very old,
and rise proportionally more for younger people. As in the Medicaid reform,
out-of-pocket medical expenditures decline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
our model. In Section 3, we brieﬂy discuss how we estimate the model’s
parameters. In Section 4, we describe the data used in this analysis. In Sec-
tion 5, we discuss the life cycle proﬁles found in the data and our estimation
results. In Section 6, we perform some policy experiments. In Section 7, we
conclude and discuss directions for future research.
2 The model
The model of consumption and medical spending decisions used in this
paper comes from De Nardi et al. [6]. We focus on single people who have
already retired. This allows us to abstract from labor supply and retirement
decisions, and from complications arising from family dynamics such as the
transition from two family members to one. We also abstract from bequest
motives (see De Nardi et al. [6] for a model with a bequest motive).
We assume that people are hit by medical needs shocks, such as cancer,
diabetes, a heart attack, or a broken bone. These shocks aﬀect their marginal
utility of consuming medical goods and services, and people choose how much
to spend in response to these shocks. A complementary approach is that of
Grossman [12], in which medical expenses represent investments in health
capital, which in turn decreases mortality (e.g., Yogo [19]) or improves health.
While some studies ﬁnd that medical expenditures have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the health and/or survival of the elderly (Card et al. [3]; Doyle [4]),
many others ﬁnd small eﬀects (Brook et al. [1]; Fisher et al. [9]; Finkelstein
and McKnight [8]; Khwaja [14]); see our previous paper for a discussion.
These ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀects of medical expenditures on the health
outcomes are at a minimum extremely diﬃcult to identify.3 Given that older
people have already shaped their health and lifestyle, we view our assumption
3Identiﬁcation problems include reverse causality—sick people have higher health
expenditures—and a lack of insurance variation—most elderly individuals receive Medicare
and/or Medicaid.
4that their health and mortality depend on their lifetime earnings, but is
exogenous to their current decisions, to be a reasonable simpliﬁcation.
2.1 The individual’s problem
Consider a single person, either male or female, seeking to maximize his or
her expected lifetime utility at age t, t = tr+1,...,T, where tr is the retirement












where t is age, ct is consumption of non-medical goods, mt is total consump-
tion of medical goods, and µt is the medical needs shifter, which aﬀects the
marginal utility of consuming medical goods and services. The consumption
of both goods is expressed in dollar values. The intertemporal elasticities for
the two goods, 1/ν and 1/ω, can diﬀer.
The individual faces several sources of risk, which we treat as exogenous:
health status risk, survival risk, and medical needs risk. At the beginning
of each period, the individual’s health status and medical needs shocks are
realized and need-based transfers are given. The individual then chooses
consumption, medical expenditure, and saves. Finally, the survival shock
hits.
Letting ht denote the retiree’s health status, we parameterize the prefer-
ence shifter for medical goods and services (the needs shock) as
ln(µ(ht,ψt,t)) = α0 + α1t + α2t
2 + α3t
3 + α4ht + α5ht × t (2)
+σ(ht,t) × ψt,
σ(ht,t)
2 = β0 + β1t + β2t
2 + β4ht + β5ht × t (3)
ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ξ), (4)











where ξt and ￿t are serially and mutually independent. We thus allow the
need for medical services to have temporary (ξt) and persistent (ζt) shocks.
It is worth stressing that we do not allow any component of µ to depend on
permanent income; income aﬀects medical expenditures solely through the
budget constraint.
5The individual’s health status, ht, varies between bad (ht = 0) and good
(ht = 1). The transition probabilities for health status depend on current
health, sex (g), permanent income (I), and age, so that the elements of the
health status transition matrix are
πj,k,g,I,t = Pr(ht+1 = k|ht = j,g,I,t), j,k ∈ {0,1}. (7)
Let st denote the probability that an individual is alive at age t + 1,
conditional on being alive at age t. This survival probability varies with sex,
health status, permanent income and age, so that st = sg,h,I,t.
Non-asset income, yt, is a deterministic function of sex, permanent in-
come, and age:
yt = y(g,I,t). (8)
Assets evolve according to
at+1 = at + yn(rat + yt) + bt − ct − mtqt ≥ 0, (9)
where yn(rat + yt,τ) denotes post-tax income, yt denotes non-asset income,
r denotes the risk-free, pre-tax rate of return, the vector τ describes the tax
structure, bt denotes government transfers, and qt denotes the co-payment
rate. We impose that if transfers are positive, the individual consumes all of
his resources (by splitting them optimally between the two goods), so that
at+1 = 0.
We model two important features of the health care system:
1. Private and public insurance pay the share 1 − q(t,ht) of the total
medical costs incurred by the retiree. Its complement, q(t,ht), is the
out-of-pocket share paid by the retiree.
2. Social insurance programs, such as Medicaid and SSI, provide monetary
transfers that vary with ﬁnancial resources and medical needs. We
model these transfers as providing a ﬂow utility ﬂoor. The transfers
thus depend on the retirees’ state variables, including their medical
needs shocks. For a given utility ﬂoor and state vector, we ﬁnd the
transfer b∗(·) = b∗(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) that puts each retiree’s utility at
the ﬂoor. Transfers then kick in to provide the minimum utility level
to retirees who otherwise could not aﬀord it:
b(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) = max{0,b
∗(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt)}. (10)
6Letting β denote the discount factor, the value function for a single indi-



















subject to equations (9) and (10).
2.2 The intratemporal allocation decision
Suppose that at time t an individual decides to spend the total xt on
consumption and out-of-pocket payments for medical goods. If the individual










Equation (12) shows that the demand for medical services is less elastic
than the demand for consumption goods if ν is less than ω. If so, as total
expenditures rise, an decreasing share will be devoted to medical goods.
The relationship between income and out-of-pocket medical expenditures,
however, also depends on social insurance and the distribution of the medical
needs shocks.








t + ct. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) allow us to map the utility ﬂoor U into the transfer bt.












7Then for any realization of µt and qt, we can solve for the expenditure ﬂoor:
xt = x(µt,qt;c)






















The ﬁnal step is to back out the transfer itself:
b(t,at,g,ht,I,ζt,ξt) = max{0,xt − at − yn(rat + yt)}. (17)
3 Estimation procedure
3.1 The method of simulated moments
We adopt a two-step strategy to estimate the model. In the ﬁrst step we
estimate or calibrate those parameters that can be cleanly identiﬁed outside
our model. For example, we estimate mortality rates from raw demographic
data. In the second step we estimate the rest of the model’s parameters with
the method of simulated moments (MSM), taking as given the parameters
that were estimated in the ﬁrst step. In particular, we ﬁnd the parameter
values that minimize the diﬀerence (as measured by a GMM criterion func-
tion) between the asset and out-of-pocket medical expense proﬁles generated
by the model and their data counterparts.
To construct the asset proﬁles, we sort individuals into permanent income
quintiles, and 5 birth-year cohorts. The ﬁrst cohort consists of individuals
that were ages 72-76 in 1996; the second cohort contains ages 77-81; the
third ages 82-86; the fourth ages 87-91; and the ﬁnal cohort, for sample
size reasons, contains ages 92-102. We use net worth data for 6 diﬀerent
years: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. To construct the proﬁles, we
calculate cell medians for all of the survivors in each year.
Regarding medical expenses, we include the following moments in our
moment conditions: mean medical expenses by age and birth cohort for each
half of the permanent income distribution; the 90th percentile of medical
expenses in the same cells; and the ﬁrst and second autocorrelations for
medical expenses in each cell. Because the AHEAD medical expense data
8are reported net of any Medicaid payments, we deduct government trans-
fers from the medical expenses generated by the model before making any
comparisons. A detailed description of these moment conditions, the asymp-
totic distribution of the parameter estimates, the weighting matrix, and the
overidentiﬁcation tests, can be found in the on-line appendix for De Nardi et
al. [6].
The mechanics of our MSM approach are as follows. We compute life-
cycle histories for a large number of artiﬁcial individuals. Each of these
individuals is endowed with a value of the state vector (t,at,g,ht,I) drawn
from the data distribution for 1996, and each is assigned a series of health,
medical expense, and mortality shocks consistent with the stochastic pro-
cesses described in the model section. We give each simulated person the
entire health and mortality history realized by a person in the AHEAD data
with the same initial conditions. The simulated medical needs shocks ζ and
ξ are Monte Carlo draws from discretized versions of our estimated shock
processes.
We discretize the asset grid and, using value function iteration, we solve
the model numerically. This yields a set of decision rules, which, in com-
bination with the simulated endowments and shocks, allows us to simulate
each individual’s net worth, medical expenditures, health, and mortality. We
then compute asset and medical expense proﬁles from the artiﬁcial histories
in the same way as we compute them from the real data.
4 Data
The AHEAD is part of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) con-
ducted by the University of Michigan. It is a survey of individuals who were
non-institutionalized and aged 70 or older in 1994. A total of 3,872 singles
were interviewed for the AHEAD survey in late 1993/early 1994, which we
refer to as 1994. These individuals were interviewed again in 1996, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. We consider only single retired individuals in
the analysis. This leaves us with 3,259 individuals, of whom 592 are men
and 2,667 are women. Of these 3,259 individuals, 884 are still alive in 2006.
Our measure of net worth (or assets) is the sum of all assets less mortgages
and other debts. The AHEAD has information on the value of housing
and real estate, autos, liquid assets (which include money market accounts,
savings accounts, T-bills, etc.), IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, the value of a farm
9or business, mutual funds, bonds, and “other” assets. We do not use 1994
assets because they were underreported (Rohwedder et al. [17]).
Non-asset income includes the value of Social Security beneﬁts, deﬁned
beneﬁt pension beneﬁts, annuities, veterans beneﬁts, welfare, and foodstamps.
We measure permanent income (PI) as the individual’s average income over
all periods during which he or she is observed. Because Social Security ben-
eﬁts and (for the most part) pension beneﬁts are monotonic functions of
average lifetime labor income, this provides a reasonable measure of lifetime,
or permanent income.
In all waves, AHEAD respondents are asked about what medical expenses
they paid out of pocket. Out-of-pocket medical expenses are the sum of what
the individual spends out of pocket on insurance premia, drug costs, and costs
for hospital, nursing home care, doctor visits, dental visits, and outpatient
care. It includes medical expenses during the last year of life. It does not
include expenses covered by insurance, either public or private. French and
Jones [11] show that the medical expense data in the AHEAD line up with
the aggregate statistics. For our sample, mean medical expenses are $3,712
with a standard deviation of $13,429 in 1998 dollars. Although this ﬁgure is
large, it is not surprising, because Medicare did not cover prescription drugs
for most of the sample period, requires co-pays for services, and caps the
number of reimbursed nursing home and hospital nights.
After being asked about all of the components of out-of-pocket medical
expenses, respondents are asked to estimate total medical expenses (out-of-
pocket plus covered by Medicaid, Medicare or other insurance). Respondents
in 1996 were asked to provide a dollar amount, whereas in 1998-2002 respon-
dents were asked only to provide ranges (in 1998 the groups were less than
$1,000, $1,000-$5,000, $5,000-$25,000, $25,000-$100,000, $100,000-$500,000,
or more than $500,000). We use the RAND imputations to infer total med-
ical expenses from these responses. Total medical expenses average $22,094
with a standard deviation of $74,637. Combining this data with our measure
of out-of-pocket expenses allows us to calculate co-pay rates.
In addition to constructing moment conditions, we also use the AHEAD
data to construct the initial distribution of permanent income, age, sex,
health, and assets that starts oﬀ our simulations. Each simulated individual is
given a state vector drawn from the joint distribution of these state variables
observed in 1996.
105 Data proﬁles and estimation results
In this section, we describe the life cycle proﬁles of the stochastic processes
that are inputs to our dynamic programming model.
5.1 Income proﬁles
We model income as a function of: a quartic in age, sex, sex interacted
with age, current health status, health status interacted with age, a quadratic
in the individual’s permanent income ranking, and permanent income rank-
ing interacted with age. We estimate these proﬁles using a ﬁxed-eﬀects esti-
mator.
Figure 1: Average income, by permanent income quintile.
Figure 1 presents average non-asset income proﬁles, conditional on perma-
nent income quintile, computed by simulating our model. In this simulation
we do not let people die, and we simulate each person’s ﬁnancial and medi-
cal history up through the oldest surviving age allowed in the model. Since
we rule out attrition, this picture shows how income evolves over time for
the same sample of elderly people. The graph with attrition, however, looks
very similar. For those in the top permanent income quintile, annual income
averages $20,000 per year. Figure 4 below shows that median wealth for the
youngest cohort in this income group is slightly under $200,000, or about 10
years worth of income.
115.2 Mortality and health status
We estimate the probability of death and bad health as logistic func-
tions of a cubic in age; sex; sex interacted with age; previous health status;
health status interacted with age; a quadratic in permanent income rank;
and permanent income rank interacted with age.
Using the estimated health transitions, survival probabilities, and the
initial joint distribution of age, health, permanent income, and sex found
in our AHEAD data, we simulate demographic histories, beginning at age
70. We ﬁnd that rich people, women, and healthy people live much longer
than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. Two extremes illustrate this
point: an unhealthy male at the bottom quintile of the permanent income
distribution expects to live only 6 more years, that is, to age 76. In contrast,
a healthy woman at the top quintile of the permanent income distribution
expects to live 17 more years, thus making it to age 87. Such signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in life expectancy should, all else being equal, lead to signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in saving behavior. In complementary work (De Nardi et al. [5]),
we show this is in fact the case.
We also ﬁnd that for rich people, the probability of living to very old ages,
and thus facing very high medical expenses, is signiﬁcant. For example, we
ﬁnd that a healthy 70-year-old woman in the top quintile of the permanent
income distribution faces a 14% chance of living 25 years, to age 95.
5.3 Co-pay rates
We calculate the co-insurance rate, q(t,ht), as the amount spent out of
pocket (less insurance premia) divided by total billable medical expenses.
Following Yogo [19], we regress the log of this on an age polynomial and
health status, and health status interacted with age.
Figure 2 presents average co-pays by age for people in our youngest cohort.
Our estimated co-pay proﬁles are lower for people in bad health and display
a non-linear pattern in age. On average, the co-pays display a drop (from
25% to less than 18%) between ages 74 and 87, but then rise again to about
19% after age 87. This is likely capturing a shift in the composition of
medical goods and services that people consume. The rise at the end of life,
in particular, could be due to an increase in the fraction of people who, as
they age and become more fragile, enter expensive nursing homes that they
pay for out of pocket.
12Figure 2: Co-pay rates by age.
5.4 Medicaid utilization rates
Although the AHEAD does not provide data on Medicaid expenditures,
respondents are asked whether they are currently covered by Medicaid. To
interpret these data, we estimate the probability of Medicaid receipt as a
function of age, permanent income, health and gender. Figure 3 shows Med-
icaid participation rates for healthy women at diﬀerent permanent income
percentiles. Figure 3 reveals that at the 10th income percentile, the Medicaid
utilization rate is about 50% at all ages. For the remaining, higher percentiles
Medicaid utilization rises with age. The age trend is most pronounced at the
70th and 90th percentiles, where participation rises from almost zero at age
70 to around 10% at age 100.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Parameter values
Our estimate of β, the discount factor is 0.99.4 The estimate of ν, the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for “regular” consumption, is 2.15, while
the estimate of ω, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for medical goods,
is 3.19; the demand for medical goods is less elastic than the demand for
consumption. The utility ﬂoor is the utility level that one gets when the




























Share on Medicaid, by Permanent Income Percentile, Women in Good Health
Figure 3: Fraction of healthy women receiving Medicaid, by PI percentile.
medical needs shifter µ equals 1 and an individual consumes 202 dollars
apiece of consumption and medical goods.
We also estimate the coeﬃcients for the mean of the logged medical needs
shifter µ(ht,ψt,t), the volatility scaler σ(ht,t) and the process for the shocks
ζt and ξt. The estimates for these parameters (available from the authors on
request) imply that the demand for medical services rises rapidly with age.
We now turn to discussing how well the model ﬁts the net worth and
medical expense data and the model’s implications for means-tested transfers
and total medical expenditures.
5.5.2 Net worth proﬁles
Figure 4 compares the net worth proﬁles generated by the model (dashed
line) and those in the data (solid line) for the members of two birth-year
cohorts. It plots median net worth by age and income quintile for those indi-
viduals that are still alive at each moment in time, that is, for an unbalanced
panel. The lines at the far left of the graph are for the youngest cohort,
whose members in 1996 were aged 72-76, with an average age of 74. The
second set of lines are for the cohort aged 82-86 in 1996.
There are ﬁve lines for each cohort because we have split the data into
permanent income quintiles. However, the ﬁfth, bottom line is hard to dis-
tinguish from the horizontal axis because households in the lowest permanent
14Figure 4: Median net worth by cohort and PI quintile: data (solid lines) and
model (dashed lines).
income quintile hold little net worth.
The members of the ﬁrst cohort appear in our sample at an average age
of 74 in 1996. We then observe them in 1998, when they are on average 76
years old, and then again every two years until 2006. The other cohorts start
from older initial ages and are followed for ten years, until 2006. The graph
reports median net worth for each cohort and permanent-income grouping
for six data points over time.
Unsurprisingly, net worth is monotonically increasing in income, so that
the bottom line shows median net worth in the lowest income quintile, while
the top line shows median net worth in the top quintile. For example, the
top left line shows that for the top PI quintile of the cohort aged 74 in
1996, median net worth started at $170,000 and then stayed fairly stable
over time: $150,000 at age 76, $160,000 at age 78, $180,000 at ages 80 and
82, and $190,000 at age 84.
For all permanent income quintiles in these cohorts, the net worth of
surviving individuals neither rise rapidly nor decline rapidly with age. If
anything, those with high income tend to have increases in their net worth,
whereas those with low income tend to have declines in net worth as they
age. The proﬁles for other cohorts, which are shown in our previous paper,
are similar. For the most part, the model replicates the main patterns found
in the asset data: the most notable exception is that the model overstates
15asset holdings in the second-lowest permanent income quintile.
5.5.3 Medical expenses
Figure 5: Average out-of-pocket medical expenses by age and permanent income.
Figure 5 displays average out-of-pocket medical expenses (that is, net of
Medicaid payments and private and public insurance co-pays) paid by people
in the model. Permanent income has a large eﬀect on out-of-pocket medical
expenses, especially at older ages. Average medical expenses are less than
$3,000 a year at age 75 and vary little with income. By age 100, they rise to
$2,400 for those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution and over
$14,000 for those at the top of the income distribution.
Figure 6 compares the out-of-pocket medical expenses generated by the
model to those found in the data. The current parameterization of the model
underestimates out-of-pocket medical risk at very old ages. As an example,
average out-of-pocket medical expenses for the oldest and richest people peak
at over $30,000, while the model generates just $16,000.
16Figure 6: Mean out-of-pocket medical expenses: data (solid lines) and model
(dashed lines).
a b
Figure 7: Average medical expenses by age and permanent income. Panel a:
paid by Medicaid. Panel b: paid by Medicaid or out-of-pocket.
17Panel a of Figure 7 displays the average medical expenses covered by
our means-tested social insurance program, measured as the increase in qtmt
generated by government transfers. “Medicaid” payments rapidly increase
with age, going from roughly zero at age 74 to nearly $9,000 at age 100.
Consistent with the redistributive nature of the program, these payments
are quite close across people of diﬀerent permanent incomes, but are higher
for the poor. Panel b of Figure 7 shows the sum of medical expenses paid
out-of-pocket and the expenses paid by Medicaid. Medicaid allows poorer
people to consume proportionally much more medical goods and services
than they pay for. As a result, the expense sum shown in panel b rises more
slowly with income than the out-of-pocket expenditures shown in Figure 5.
At age 100, people in the top permanent income quintile spend 470% more
out-of-pocket than people in the bottom quintile. Once Medicaid is included,
the diﬀerence narrows to 80%.
a b
Figure 8: Average medical expenses by age and permanent income. Panel a:
paid by insurers. Panel b: total.
Panel a of Figure 8 displays average medical expenses covered by private
and public insurers. These payments are very large and also increase by
age and permanent income, reaching over $90,000 for the oldest members
of the top permanent income quintile. The oldest in the poorest permanent
income quintile, however, also beneﬁt from these payments, which reach over
$60,000 at age 100. Panel b of Figure 8 displays total medical expenses,
which in this case also coincides with total consumption of medical goods
and services. Comparing the two panels makes it clear that most elderly
individuals consume far more medical care than they for pay out-of-pocket.
18The increase in total medical expenses after retirement is very large, going
from around $10,000 at age 74 to $60 to $100 thousand at age 99.
5.6 Utility ﬂoor, preference shocks, and implied insur-
ance system
Through the interaction of the utility ﬂoor and medical needs shocks,
the model has interesting implications on the insurance provided by means-
tested programs. Our utility ﬂoor is based on the consumption of $202 in
medical goods and $202 of non-medical goods with the medical preference
shifter equalling 1. The interpretation of this number is not obvious, however,
because people with higher medical needs receive larger transfers.
a b
Figure 9: Means-tested transfers. Panel a: fraction receiving transfers. Panel b:
average transfers per recipient.
Figure 9 describes the transfers generated by the model. Panel a of this
ﬁgure shows the fraction of individuals receiving transfers, while panel b
shows transfers per recipient. Although the model implies lower Medicaid
participation rates than found in the data, it captures the way in which
Medicaid usage increases with age. Initially, very few people receive transfers,
but as people age, and medical needs increase, more people become eligible.
By age 100, over 10% of people receive transfers. The vast majority of the
transfers are received by people with large medical needs and are thus spent
on medical goods and services, rather than on non-medical consumption.
Because people in the top permanent income quintile receive transfers only
19when their medical needs are extremely severe, very few of them receive
transfers, but the average transfer is high. Even after age 95, only about
4% of this group receive transfers, with an average transfer in excess of
$100,000. In contrast, after age 95, the average transfer in the bottom quintile
is less than $50,000, but over 16% of this group receive transfers. Because
the distribution of the medical needs shifter µt does not depend directly on
income, the increased rate of recipiency found in the bottom income quintile
means that the poor on average receive more transfers than the rich; see the
discussion of Figure 7.
At any income level, however, the baseline parameterization of the con-
sumption ﬂoor, coupled with our estimated medical needs shocks, can lead to
very large transfers, which provide signiﬁcant insurance against devastating
medical illnesses.
6 Policy experiments
In the spirit of the recently debated health reforms, we study the eﬀects
of making public health insurance more generous. In the ﬁrst experiment, we
analyze an increase in the generosity of Medicaid by raising the utility ﬂoor
by 50%. In the second experiment, we analyze an increase in the number of
insured individuals by reducing co-payment rates by 25%.
6.1 A more generous means-tested program
In this policy experiment, we increase the generosity of means-tested in-
surance by increasing the level of the utility ﬂoor by 50%.5 Figure 10 shows
how transfers vary with the preference shifter µt for both the benchmark and
the experiment with the higher utility ﬂoor. Figure 10 shows that in order
to maintain a higher utility ﬂoor, transfers become much larger at all levels
of medical need.
This increase in the insurance provided by the government leads people
to save less for medical needs, and generates large reductions in net worth.
Panel a of Figure 11 plots the net worth of the youngest cohort for the bench-
mark calibration (dashed line) and for the experiment with more generous
means-tested programs (solid line). Households deplete their assets more
5More precisely, we increase the consumption equivalent c by 50%.






















































Figure 10: Means-tested transfers as a function of µ(·). Dashed line: benchmark,
solid line: experiment with more generous utility ﬂoor.
quickly in the speciﬁcation with more generous insurance. The median as-
set holding of 95-year-old people in the highest permanent income quintile
drops 22%, from $57,000 to $44,000; the median asset holding of 95-year-
old people in the lowest permanent income quintile drops 51%, from $1,900
to $900. The declines are thus proportionally much larger for poorer peo-
ple, who are the ones most likely to beneﬁt to beneﬁt from a means-tested
transfer program. However, richer people also risk being wiped out by large
medical expenses and thus beneﬁt from the increased insurance provided by
the higher consumption ﬂoor.
Raising the utility ﬂoor aﬀects medical expenditures in several ways. The
obvious direct eﬀect of a higher ﬂoor is to raise the medical expenditures of
individuals eligible for assistance. Moreover, raising the ﬂoor reduces the
need to save, which will, holding assets ﬁxed, lead individuals to increase
their consumption of both medical and non-medical goods. Reduced saving,
on the other hand, will lower medical expenditures in the future. Panel b of
Figure 11 shows that a more generous utility ﬂoor increases total consumption
of medical goods and services, especially after age 90 and for those in the
bottom two permanent income quintiles.
21a b
Figure 11: Net worth (panel a) and total medical expenses (panel b) by age and
permanent income. Dashed line: benchmark, solid line: experiment
with more generous utility ﬂoor.
a b
Figure 12: Medicaid payments (panel a) and out-of-pocket medical expenses
(panel b) by age and permanent income. Dashed line: benchmark,
solid line: experiment with more generous utility ﬂoor.
22Panel a of Figure 12 shows that the higher utility ﬂoor, along with the
resulting decrease in assets, increases Medicaid payments. Panel b shows
that a more generous insurance system reduces out-of-pocket medical expen-
ditures; the reduction in the consumers’ cost share outweighs the increase in
total medical expenditures.
6.2 A more generous co-insurance system
In this policy experiment we reduce the co-payment schedule by 25%. As
in the previous experiment, the households react to the increased insurance
by running down their assets more rapidly. This experiment, however, has
smaller eﬀects than the previous one (see Figure 13), and the largest eﬀects
occur at earlier ages. For example, the assets of 95-year-old people in the
top permanent income group drop by 12%, while the assets in the bottom
group change by 0.1%.
a b
Figure 13: Net worth (panel a) and total medical expenses (panel b). Dashed:
benchmark, solid: more generous co-insurance system.
Panel b of Figure 13 shows that total medical expenses go up at all ages,
especially for households in the highest permanent income quintiles. While
the largest increases in absolute terms occur at the oldest ages, the increase
at younger ages represent larger proportions.
Figure 14 shows that reducing the co-pay rates reduces out-of-pocket
medical costs at all ages, especially for those with higher permanent income.
Because individuals in the lower income quintiles rely more heavily on Med-
icaid, they are less likely to incur co-pays. As a result, their medical care
23decisions are less sensitive to changes in co-payment rates. While lower co-
pay rates increase total medical expenditures, this increase in quantities is
more than oﬀset by the reduction in the consumers’ out-of-pocket shares.
Medicaid payments go down for similar reasons. The increase in total medi-
cal expenses is thus borne entirely by insurers, as shown in Figure 15. Given
that Medicare is by far the principal insurer for retirees, we see an important
interaction between the Medicaid and Medicare programs: increases in the
generosity of Medicare reduce Medicaid payments.
Our ﬁnding that a decrease in the out-of-pocket price of medical expen-
ditures leads to a reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures indicates that the
elasticity for medical goods is fairly small. In a recent study, Fonseca et
al. [10] calculate that the co-insurance elasticity for total medical expen-
ditures ranges from -0.27 to -0.35, which they ﬁnd to be consistent with
existing micro evidence. Repeating their experiment (a 150% increase in co-
pay rates) with our model reveals that elasticities range widely by age and
income: richer and younger people have higher elasticities. To calculate a
summary number, we use our model of mortality and an annual population
growth rate of 1.5% to ﬁnd a cross-sectional distribution of ages. Combin-
ing this number with our simulations, we ﬁnd an aggregate cross-sectional
elasticity of -0.46.
a b
Figure 14: Medicaid payments (panel a) and out-of-pocket medical expenses
(panel b) by age and permanent income. Dashed line: benchmark,
solid line: experiment with more generous co-insurance system.
24Figure 15: Medical insurer payments by age and permanent income. Dashed line:
benchmark, solid line: experiment with more generous co-insurance
system.
7 Conclusions and extensions
In this paper we use a model of saving and endogenous medical expen-
diture to study reforms to the Medicare and Medicaid systems. We ﬁnd
that the insurance provided by Medicaid is important at all income levels.
Although richer individuals use Medicare much less frequently than poorer
ones, the transfers they do receive often cover catastrophic medical expen-
ditures. As a result, making Medicaid more generous reduces saving in all
income groups.
We also consider the eﬀects of reducing the price of medical care, by
reducing co-payment rates. We ﬁnd that the demand for medical services
is fairly inelastic (less than one-half), so that decreases in co-pays lead to
decreases in out-of-pocket medical expenses. This low elasticity is consistent
with estimates from several other studies. Because individuals in the lower
income quintiles rely more heavily on Medicaid, their medical care decisions
are less sensitive to changes in co-pays. Reducing co-payment rates has a
larger eﬀect on the out-of-pocket medical expenditures of the rich.
We ﬁnish by considering a few promising extensions. Our model suggests
that changes in the Medicaid program lead to large changes in saving. This
25in turn suggests that the insurance provided by Medicaid has a large welfare
eﬀects. One way to test such a proposition is to measure the value of Medi-
caid through compensating diﬀerential calculations like those in Brown and
Finkelstein [2]. These beneﬁts can then be compared to Medicaid expendi-
tures.
The model used in this paper uses parameter values taken from De Nardi
et al. [6]. While the model does a good job of matching other features of
the data, it understates Medicaid participation. One way to improve the
model’s ﬁt along this dimension is to expand our MSM criterion function
to include Medicaid participation rates and re-estimate the model’s parame-
ters. Preliminary estimates using this approach show that making the utility
ﬂoor more generous signiﬁcantly increases simulated Medicaid participation.
Continued work in this direction should lead to a more realistic model.
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